Optimal Joint Bidding and Pricing of Profit-seeking Load Serving Entity by Xu, Hanchen et al.
1Optimal Joint Bidding and Pricing of Profit-seeking
Load Serving Entity
Hanchen Xu, Student Member, IEEE, Kaiqing Zhang, Student Member, IEEE, and Junbo Zhang, Member, IEEE
Abstract—The demand response provides an opportunity for
load serving entities (LSEs) that operate retail electricity markets
(REMs) to strategically purchase energy and provide reserves in
wholesale electricity markets (WEMs). This paper concerns with
the problem of simultaneously determining the optimal energy
bids and reserve offers an LSE submits to the WEM as well as
the optimal energy and reserve prices it sets in the REM so as
to maximize its profit. To this end, we explicitly model the tri-
layer market structure that consists of a WEM, a REM, and a
set of end user customers, so as to capture the coupling between
the bidding problem and the pricing problem. Based on the tri-
layer market model, we then formulate the joint bidding and
pricing problem as a bi-level programming problem and further
transform it into a single-level mixed integer linear programming
problem, which can be solved efficiently. Numerical studies using
the IEEE test cases are presented to illustrate the application of
the proposed methodology as well as to reveal several interesting
characteristics of the LSE’s profit-seeking behavior.
Index Terms—electricity market, profit-seeking, load serving
entity, bidding, pricing.
NOMENCLATURE
Acronyms:
DR : demand response
EUC : end user customer
GEN : generator
ISF : injection shifting factor
ISO : independent system operator
LF : loss factor
LMP : locational marginal price
LSE : load serving entity
MILP : mixed integer linear programing
REM : retail electricity market
WEM : wholesale electricity market
Symbols:
N : index set of buses
L : index set of lines
G : index set of GEN offers
D : index set of LSE bids
N˜ : index set of buses where the LSE submits bids
D˜ : index set of the LSE’s bids
D˜k : index set of the LSE’s bids submitted at bus ik ∈ N˜
C : index set of EUCs associated with the LSE
Ck : index set of EUCs associated with bus ik ∈ N˜
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M : a sufficiently large number
f : maximum line active power flow vector (MW)
Λ : LF vector
Ψ : ISF matrix
ag : GEN marginal energy offer price vector ($/MWh)
bg : GEN marginal reserve offer price vector ($/MW)
pg : GEN maximum active power supply vector (MW)
pg : GEN minimum active power supply vector (MW)
rg : GEN maximum reserve vector (MW)
ad : LSE marginal energy bid price vector ($/MWh)
bd : LSE marginal reserve offer price vector ($/MW)
pd : LSE maximum active power demand vector (MW)
pd : LSE minimum active power demand vector (MW)
rd : LSE maximum reserve vector (MW)
Φg : GEN offer to bus mapping matrix
Φd : LSE offer to bus mapping matrix
α : maximum allowed energy price for EUCs ($/MWh)
α : minimum allowed energy price for EUCs ($/MWh)
β : maximum allowed reserve price for EUCs ($/MWh)
β : minimum allowed reserve price for EUCs ($/MWh)
αk : energy price for EUCs in Ck ($/MWh)
βk : reserve price for EUCs in Ck ($/MW)
c(k) : energy benefit function coefficient vector
of EUCs in Ck ($/MWh)
b(k) : reserve cost function coefficient vector
of EUCs in Ck ($/MW)
p : net active power injection vector (MW)
pg : active power supply vector (MW)
pd : active power demand vector (MW)
rg : GEN reserve vector (MW)
rd : LSE reserve vector (MW)
pii : LMP at bus i ∈ N ($/MWh)
x(k) : energy demand vector of EUCs in Ck (MW)
y(k) : reserve provision vector of EUCs in Ck (MW)
1 : all-ones vector with appropriate dimension
0 : all-zeros vector with appropriate dimension
I. INTRODUCTION
THE demand response (DR) has proven to be a key com-ponent of the smart grid paradigm [1], [2] and has played
a critical role in maintaining power system reliability [3]. A
paramount driving force behind the impressive success of the
DR is the market mechanisms in both wholesale electricity
markets (WEMs) operated by independent system operators
(ISOs) and retail electricity markets (REMs) operated by load
serving entities (LSEs) [3]. Conventionally, a LSE purchases
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2energy in a WEM to meet the typically inelastic demands and
charge a fixed tarrif from the end user customers (EUCs) that
participate in its REM. The rapid development of various DR
programs such as real-time pricing has significantly increased
the demand-side flexibility, enabling more elasticity in the
modeling of the load [4], [5]. With such flexibility, the LSEs
can now embrace the opportunities to strategically purchase
energy, and additionally, provide reserves in the WEM, possi-
bly with the objective of maximizing its own profits [6], [7].
In most conventional market models such as the one in [8],
the LSE acts as an aggregator for the EUCs and submits the
energy bids and reserve offers to the ISO. However, in reality,
the LSE as a middleman has the capability to determine a
retail price different from the one posted by the ISO for its
own profit [9]. Moreover, the LSE may strategically change
its energy bids and reserve offers submitted to the WEM in
order to impact market clearing results in some circumstances
to increase its profit. As such, in the aforementioned market
environment, a profit-seeking LSE is faced with two problems:
(i) determining optimal energy bids and reserve offers it
submits to the ISO, referred to as the bidding problem; and
(ii) determining optimal energy and reserve prices it charges
from or pays to the EUCs, referred to as the pricing problem.
Existing works are mostly only concerned with either one
of the two problems. For example, despite of different models,
[10], [11] both focus on the problem of optimal bidding, where
[10] exploits the formulation of mathematical program with
equilibrium constraints while [11] resorts to the modeling of
supply function equilibrium. Moreover, [12], [13] consider
developing the bidding strategy for specific LSEs, i.e., the
aggregator of electric vehicles and unmanned aerial vehicles,
both in day-ahead markets. Regrading pricing, [14] proposes
a Stackelberg game between LSEs and EUCs to maximize
the revenue of each LSE while [15] addresses the same
problem under the assumption that the LSE is capable of
learning/estimating the EUC’s power consumption patterns for
its own profits. Similarly, [16] proposes a dynamic pricing
strategy also with the leader-follower game-theoretic model. In
[17], an energy management system (EMS), which resembles
the role of an LSE, coordinates the price-responsive demands
to maximize their utility. In this regard, the EMS is not a
profit-seeking entity as we consider in the present work.
Yet, from the perspective of an LSE, the optimal solutions to
its bidding problem and pricing problem are indeed inherently
coupled. Specifically, these two problems are coupled by the
physical constraint that the LSE must balance the energy
purchased in the WEM and that sold in the REM, as well
as the reserve sold in the WEM and that purchased in the
REM. Moreover, the total profit gained by the LSE depends
on both the wholesale prices and the retail prices, as well
as the cleared quantities of energy/reserve. In the meantime,
the cleared quantities of energy/reserve and their prices in
WEM/REM have direct impacts on each other. As a result,
the separate consideration of these two problems will lead to
a situation where the LSE fails to make the energy/reserve
balance and cannot harvest the highest profit. Therefore, the
joint consideration of the bidding problem and the pricing
problem is indeed more desirable. However, to the best of
our knowledge, the joint bidding and pricing problem has not
been well studied yet. Indeed, the challenge of simultaneously
determining the optimal bids and prices lies in formulating this
problem in a solvable form.
To this end, we explicitly model the tri-layer market struc-
ture, which consists of a WEM, a REM, and a set of EUCs, so
as to capture the structural characteristics of actual markets.
This model, referred to as the tri-layer market model, allows us
to explicitly take into account the inherent coupling between
the bidding problem and the pricing problem. Based on the
tri-layer market model, we then formulate the joint bidding
and pricing problem as a bi-level programming problem, in
which the profit maximization problem of the LSE serves as
the upper-level problem, and the WEM clearing problem and
the EUC benefit maximization problem serve as the lower-
level problem. Yet, this bi-level programming problem, which
has two optimization problems as constraints, is generally hard
to solve [18]; therefore, we further prove that it can be trans-
formed into a single-level mixed integer linear programming
(MILP) problem, leveraging similar linearization techniques
as in [19]. As a result, the joint bidding and pricing problem
can be solved efficiently using existing commercial solvers.
We show through numerical studies that the proposed model
and formulation can simultaneously solve the bidding problem
and the pricing problem. The impacts of such profit-seeking
behavior on market efficiency are also explored numerically.
The major contributions of this paper are the following:
(i) we formulate the joint bidding and pricing problem of an
LSE as a bi-level programming problem based on the tri-layer
market model; (ii) we transform the hard-to-solve bi-level
programming problem, in which the WEM clearing problem
and the EUC benefit maximization problem are embedded,
to an equivalent single-level MILP problem and thus can be
solved efficiently; and (iii) we validate the effectiveness of the
proposed model via numerical simulations and reveal several
interesting characteristics of the LSE’s profit-seeking behavior.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to study
the joint bidding and pricing problem.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II introduces the tri-layer market model, based on which the
joint bidding and pricing problem is formulated as a bi-level
programming problem in Section III. The bi-level program-
ming problem is further transformed into a single-level MILP
problem in Section IV. In Section V, the application of the
proposed methodology is illustrated. Section VI concludes our
work and discusses potential future work directions.
II. TRI-LAYER MARKET MODEL
In this section, we introduce the tri-layer market model, the
structure of which is illustrated in Fig. 1. The tri-layer market
model consists of an upper layer representing a WEM, a mid-
dle layer representing a REM, and a lower layer representing
a set of EUCs that participate in the REM.
A. Upper Layer: Wholesale Electricity Market
Assume the ISO operates a transmission network that con-
sists of a set of buses indexed by N = {1, · · · , N} and a
3Fig. 1. Tri-layer structure of the electricity markets.
set of transmission lines indexed by L = {1, · · · , L}. Let fi
denote the maximum active power flow on line i, i ∈ L, and
define f = [f1, · · · , fL]>. Typically, in the WEM clearing
model, the nonlinear relationship between the system losses
and the active power injections can be approximated by the
so-called loss factors (LFs), and that between the line flows
and the active power injections can be approximated by the
injection shifting factors (ISFs) [20], [21]. Let Λi denote the
LF at bus i, i ∈ N , and define Λ = [Λ1, · · · ,ΛN ]>. Let
Ψ ∈ RL×N denote the ISF matrix, where Ψij is the sensitivity
of the power flow on line i with respect to net power injection
at bus j. Denote the net power injections at bus i by pi and
define p = [p1, · · · , pN ]>.
Consider a WEM where energy and spinning reserve are
jointly cleared. A set of generators (GENs) submit energy and
reserve offers in the WEM and a set of LSEs submit energy
bids and reserve offers. Without loss of generality, we assume
each energy offer/bid is associated with one reserve offer. For
the purpose of simplicity, we refer to the energy and reserve
offers from GENs as GEN offers, and energy bids and reserve
offers from LSEs as LSE bids. Let G = {1, · · · , G} be the
index set of GEN offers and D = {1, · · · , D} be the index
set of LSE bids.
An offer/bid is defined to be a five-tuple that consists of
marginal price, minimum quantity, and maximum quantity,
for energy and reserve. Denote GEN offer i, i ∈ G, as
(agi , p
g, pg, bgi , r
g
i ), where a
g
i and b
g
i are the marginal offer
prices for energy and reserve, respectively, pg
i
, pgi are the
respective minimum and maximum active power supplies, and
rgi is the maximum reserve. Define a
g = [ag1, · · · , agG]>, pg =
[pg
1
, · · · , pg
G
]>, pg = [pg1, · · · , pgG]>, bg = [bg1, · · · , bgG]>, and
rg = [rg1, · · · , rgG]>. Similarly, denote LSE bid i, i ∈ D,
as (adi , p
d, pd, bdi , r
d
i ), where a
d
i and b
d
i are the marginal bid
price for energy and the marginal offer price for reserve,
respectively, pd
i
, pdi are the respective minimum and maximum
power demands, and rdi is the maximum reserve. Define a
d =
[ad1, · · · , adD]>, pd = [pd1, · · · , pdD]>, pd = [pd1, · · · , pdD]>,
bd = [bd1, · · · , bdD]>, rd = [rd1, · · · , rdD]>. Without loss of
generality, we assume the minimum reserve is zero.
Let Φg ∈ RN×G be the GEN offer to bus mapping matrix,
the (i, j)th entry of which is 1 if the jth offer from GEN is
associated with bus i. The LSE bid to bus mapping matrix,
denoted by Φd ∈ RN×D, is defined in a similar way. Note
that there is one and only one non-zero entry in each column,
i.e., each offer/bid is only allowed to be submitted at one bus.
The WEM clearing problem for a single period,1 which
determines the cleared quantities, pg , pd, rg , rd, can be
formulated as follows:
maximize
pg,pd,rg,rd
− (ag)>pg + (ad)>pd − (bg)>rg − (bd)>rd
subject to
(1−Λ)>(Φgpg −Φdpd) = 0, ↔ λ (1a)
−f ≤ Ψ(Φgpg −Φdpd) ≤ f , ↔ µ,µ (1b)
1>rg + 1>rd ≥ r, ↔ ν (1c)
pg ≤ pg ≤ pg − rg, ↔ ρg,ρg (1d)
pd + rd ≤ pd ≤ pd, ↔ ρd,ρd (1e)
0 ≤ rg ≤ rg, ↔ ηg,ηg (1f)
0 ≤ rd ≤ rd, ↔ ηd,ηd (1g)
where r is the minimum reserve required, λ, µ ∈ RL, µ ∈ RL,
ν, ρg ∈ RG, ρg ∈ RG, ρd ∈ RD, ρd ∈ RD, ηg ∈ RG,
ηg ∈ RG, ηd ∈ RD, and ηd ∈ RD are dual variables
associated with corresponding constraints, and 1 is the all-
ones vector with an appropriate dimension. The objective
function of the WEM clearing problem is the social welfare
and the market clearing process aims to maximize the social
welfare. Constraint (1a) is the power balance constraint with
the explicit consideration of losses. Constraint (1b) is the line
active power flow constraint. Constraint (1c) sets the minimum
reserve requirements. Constraints (1d) to (1f) are the capacity
constraints.
The WEM clearing problem defined by (1) determines the
clearing prices for energy and reserve, as well as the quantities
cleared from each offer and bid. Specifically, the clearing price
of the reserves is ν, and the locational marginal price (LMP)
of energy at bus i ∈ N , denoted by pii, is calculated using the
dual variables as follows [21]:
pii = λ− Λiλ+
L∑
j=1
(µ
j
− µj)Ψji. (2)
B. Middle Layer: Retail Electricity Market
Consider a LSE that submits a set of energy bids and reserve
offers denoted by D˜ ⊆ D with |D˜| = D˜, where | · | denotes
the cardinality of a set. Assume the LSE submits bids at a
set of buses indexed by N˜ = {i1, · · · , in} ⊆ N . Partition D˜
into n non-overlapping subsets, D˜1, · · · , D˜n, such that D˜ =
D˜1 ∪ · · · ∪ D˜n and bids in D˜k are submitted at bus ik, where
the LMP is piik . If a bid of the LSE gets cleared in the WEM,
it will be charged at LMP for energy and paid at ν for reserve.
From the LSE’s perspective, piik , for any ik ∈ N˜ , ν, pdj and
rdj for any j ∈ D˜ are functions of its bids defined through
1The single-period market clearing problem can be extended to a multi-
period market clearing problem simply by including the same constraints for
each single period and additionally imposing ramping constrains.
4(1). The LSE may be able to change its clearing results by
adjusting its bids. We assume the minimum and maximum
quantities are fixed and the only decision variables in a bid
are the marginal prices.
Assume the LSE operates a REM with a set of EUCs in-
dexed by C = {1, · · · , C}. Partition C into n non-overlapping
subsets, C1, · · · , Cn, such that C = C1 ∪ · · · ∪ Cn and EUCs
in Ck are associated with bus ik in the transmission network.
We refer to Ck as pricing area k. Define Ck = |Ck|. The
LSE needs to determine the energy price αk and the reserve
price βk for EUCs in Ck, for k = 1, . . . , n. For a profit-
seeking LSE, αk and βk are chosen in such a way that its
revenue is maximized. The price signals are sent to each
EUC, which will then adjust its energy consumption and the
reserve provision. Let p(k)i and r
(k)
i denote the respective
energy demand and reserve provision from the ith EUC in Ck.
Define p(k) = [p(k)1 , · · · , p(k)Ck ]> and r(k) = [r
(k)
1 , · · · , r(k)Ck ]>.
From the LSE’s perspective, p(k) and r(k) are functions of αk
and βk defined through an optimization problem that we will
discuss in more details in next section.
The LSE has to determine αk and βk for k = 1 · · · , n,
as well as adj and b
d
j for all j ∈ D˜, so as to maximize its
total revenue from energy and reserve while ensuring that
the energy purchased from the WEM and that sold in the
REM balance at each bus in the transmission network, so
do the reserve sold in the WEM and that purchased in the
REM. This problem can be formulated as the following bi-
level programming problem:
maximize
adj ,b
d
j ,∀j∈D˜
αk,βk,k=1··· ,n
n∑
k=1
∑
j∈D˜k
((αk − piik)pdj + (ν − βk)rdj )
subject to
piik = λ− Λikλ+
L∑
j=1
(µ
j
− µj)Ψjik ,∀k, (3a)
∑
j∈D˜k
pdj = 1
>p(k),∀k, (3b)
∑
j∈D˜k
rdj = 1
>r(k),∀k, (3c)
α ≤ αk ≤ α, β ≤ βk ≤ β, ∀k, (3d)
(1), (6), ∀k. (3e)
where α, α, β, β are price caps. The first term in the objective
function is the total profit from energy trading and the second
term is the total profit from reserve trading. Constraint (3a) is
the expression to calculate the LMP. Constraints (3b) and (3c)
ensure the respective energy and reserve balances. Constraint
(3d) restricts the energy and reserve prices within a pre-
specified range. The impacts from the WEM and the EUCs
are represented respectively by (1) and (6) (to be detailed in
next section) in constraint (3e). Specifically, λ, µ
j
, and µj are
determined through (1), while p(k) and r(k) are determined
through (6).
C. Lower Layer: End User Customers
Each EUC purchases energy and sells reserve in the REM.
The objective of the ith EUC in Ck is to maximize its own
benefit given the prices αk and βk. The EUC determines its
energy demand p(k)i and reserve provision r
(k)
i by solving the
following problem:
maximize
p
(k)
i ,r
(k)
i
g
(k)
i (p
(k)
i )− αkp(k)i + βkr(k)i − h(k)i (r(k)i )
subject to
p(k)
i
+ r
(k)
i ≤ p(k)i ≤ p(k)i , (4a)
0 ≤ r(k)i ≤ r(k)i , (4b)
where g(k)i is the energy benefit function of the i
th EUC in
Ck, and h(k)i is the reserve cost function. To simplify the
EUC modeling, we assume g(k)i and h
(k)
i are piecewise linear
functions, i.e., g(k)i (p
(k)
i ) =
∑n(k)i
j=1 c
(k)
i,j x
(k)
i,j and h
(k)
i (r
(k)
i ) =∑n(k)i
j=1 d
(k)
i,j y
(k)
i,j , where x
(k)
i,j ∈ [x(k)i,j , x(k)i,j ] and y(k)i,j ∈ [0, y(k)i,j ]
are the jth block of energy demand and reserve provision
of the ith EUC in Ck, respectively, and n(k)i is the number
of blocks. Note that p(k)i =
∑nj
j=1 x
(k)
i,j , r
(k)
i =
∑nj
j=1 y
(k)
i,j ,∑n(k)i
j=1 x
(k)
i,j = p
(k)
i
,
∑n(k)i
j=1 x
(k)
i,j = p
(k)
i , and
∑n(k)i
j=1 y
(k)
i,j = r
(k)
i .
Then, (4) becomes
maximize
x
(k)
i,j ,y
(k)
i,j
n
(k)
i∑
j=1
(
(c
(k)
i,j − αk)x(k)i,j + (βk − d(k)i,j )y(k)i,j
)
subject to
x
(k)
i,j + y
(k)
i,j ≤ x(k)i,j ≤ x(k)i,j , j = 1, · · · , nj , (5a)
0 ≤ y(k)i,j ≤ y(k)i,j , j = 1, · · · , nj . (5b)
Problem (5) solved by each EUC is independent of problems
solved by others. The set of problem of EUCs in Ck can be
aggregately written in the following vector-form:
maximize
x(k),y(k)
(c(k))>x(k)−αk1>x(k)+βk1>y(k)−(d(k))>y(k)
subject to
x(k) + y(k) ≤ x(k) ≤ x(k), ↔ γ(k),γ(k) (6a)
0 ≤ y(k) ≤ y(k), ↔ ζ(k), ζ(k) (6b)
where c(k) and d(k) are the coefficients of the energy benefit
functions and reserve cost functions, γ(k), γ(k), ζ(k) and ζ
(k)
are dual variables associated with corresponding constraints.
D. Discussion
It is in general inconvenient for an LSE to know the exact
utility functions of the EUCs. However, an LSE could assume
some form of the utility functions and further approximate
them using piecewise linear functions, such as the method in
the prior work [11]. The parameters of such functions may be
estimated from actual data using some forecast techniques for
energy consumption, e.g., in [22]. Yet, the estimation of the
5parameters in these functions is another interesting problem,
which is worth of being investigated in future works.
Another interesting topic is how to determine the constraints
when an EUC makes its decision in reality. As a basic
proof-of-concept for the tri-layer market structure, we use
the common box constraints of power consumption, which is
based on an assumption that the utility function of an EUC can
be estimated by the LSE using collected data, and then these
box constraints can be well captured by the piecewise linear
utility function. For EUCs with specific constraints, we believe
a more complete and detailed model for the EUCs is indeed
necessary and deserve further investigation in the future.
III. JOINT BIDDING AND PRICING PROBLEM
FORMULATION
In this section, we formulate the joint bidding and pricing
problem of the LSE into a single-level mixed integer program-
ming (MIP) problem by plugging the KKT conditions of the
upper layer problem (1) and the lower layer problem (6) into
the middle layer problem (3) .
A. Characterization of WEM Clearing Problem
The clearing results of the WEM can be characterized by
the KKT conditions of problem (1) derived as follows:
Stationarity:
ag − (Φg)>(λ(1−Λ) + Ψ>(µ− µ))− ρg + ρg = 0,
−ad + (Φd)>(λ(1−Λ) + Ψ>(µ− µ))− ρd + ρd = 0,
bg − ν1 + ρg − ηg + ηg = 0,
bd − ν1 + ρd − ηd + ηd = 0.
(7)
Primal feasibility:
(1a)− (1g). (8)
Dual feasibility:
µ ≥ 0,µ ≥ 0, ν ≥ 0,ρg ≥ 0,ρg ≥ 0,
ρd ≥ 0,ρd ≥ 0,ηg ≥ 0,ηg ≥ 0,ηd ≥ 0,ηd ≥ 0. (9)
Complementary slackness:
µ ◦ (Ψ(Φgpg −Φdpd) + f) = 0,
µ ◦ (Ψ(Φgpg −Φdpd)− f) = 0,
ν(1>rg + 1>rd − r) = 0, ρg ◦ (pg − pg) = 0, (10)
ρg ◦ (pg + rg − pg) = 0, ηg ◦ (rg − rg) = 0,
ρd ◦ (pd − rd − pd) = 0, ρd ◦ (pd − pd) = 0,
ηd ◦ (rd − rd) = 0, ηg ◦ rg = 0, ηd ◦ rd = 0,
where ◦ indicates element-wise product, and 0 is the all-zeros
vector with an appropriate dimension. Note that constraints
(7) to (9) are linear. The only non-linear constraints are the
complementary slackness conditions, which are indeed bilinear
with respect to the unknown primal and dual variables.
B. Characterization of EUC Benefit Maximization Problem
The benefit maximization problem of EUCs in Ck can be
completely characterized by the KKT conditions of problem
(6) derived as follows:
Stationarity:
−c(k) + αk1− γ(k) + γ(k) = 0,
d(k) − βk1 + γ(k) − ζ(k) + ζ(k) = 0.
(11)
Primal feasibility:
(6a)− (6b). (12)
Dual feasibility:
γ(k) ≥ 0,γ(k) ≥ 0, ζ(k) ≥ 0, ζ(k) ≥ 0. (13)
Complementary slackness:
γ(k) ◦ (x(k) − y(k) − x(k)) = 0,
γ(k) ◦ (x(k) − x(k)) = 0,
ζ(k) ◦ y(k) = 0, ζ(k) ◦ (y(k) − y(k)) = 0.
(14)
Similar to the stationarity condition in the WEM clearing
problem, equation (11) is linear with respect to marginal prices
of benefit/cost and the dual variables. The only non-linear
constraints are the complementary slackness conditions, which
are bilinear with respect to the primal and dual variables.
C. Formulation of LSE Joint Bidding and Pricing Problem
Replacing (3e) in (3) by the KKT conditions III-A and III-B,
we can obtain the joint bidding and pricing problem of LSE
i as follows:
maximize
adj ,b
d
j ,∀j∈D˜
αk,βk,k=1··· ,n
n∑
k=1
∑
j∈D˜k
((αk − piik)pdj + (ν − βk)rdj )
subject to
(3a)− (3d), (7)− (14), (15)
which has a bilinear constraints and objective function, with
continuous/binary decision variables.
The formulation of the LSE joint bidding and pricing
problem requires the LSE hypothesizes offer/bid functions of
other WEM participants, and benefit and cost functions of
EUCs that participate in the REM as in existing works [10],
[19]. While the estimation or learning of offer/bid functions
is itself an interesting and valuable problem, it is out the
scope of this paper. We refer the interested readers to [23]
and references therein for more details.
IV. LSE JOINT BIDDING AND PRICING PROBLEM
LINEARIZATION
The MIP in Section II has bilinear constraints and objective
function, which poses significant challenge to solve it. In
this section, we linearize the bilinear terms and transform the
complete pricing problem (15) into an MILP problem.
6A. Linearization of Complementary Slackness Conditions
Using the techniques from [24], the bilinear complementary
slackness conditions (III-A) can be linearized as follows:
Ψ(Φgpg −Φdpd) + f ≤M(1− zµ), µ ≤Mzµ,
f −Ψ(Φgpg −Φdpd) ≤M(1− zµ), µ ≤Mzµ,
r − 1>rg + 1>rd ≤M(1− zν), ν ≤Mzν ,
pg − pg ≤M(1− zρg ), ρg ≤Mzρg ,
pg − pg − rg ≤M(1− zρg ), ρg ≤Mzρg ,
pd − rd − pd ≤M(1− zρd), ρd ≤Mzρd ,
pd − pd ≤M(1− zρd), ρd ≤Mzρd ,
rg ≤M(1− zηg ), ηg ≤Mzηg ,
rg − rg ≤M(1− zηg ), ηg ≤Mzηg ,
rd ≤M(1− zηd), ηd ≤Mzηd ,
rd − rd ≤M(1− zηd), ηd ≤Mzηd ,
zµ, zµ, zµ, zρ
g
, zρ
g
,
zρ
d
, zρ
d
, zη
g
, zη
g
, zη
d
, zη
d
∈ {0, 1}.
(16)
where M is a big number 2.
Similarly, the bilinear complementary slackness conditions
(14) can be linearized as follows:
x(k) − y(k) − x(k) ≤M(1− zγ(k)), γ(k) ≤Mzγ(k) ,
x(k) − x(k) ≤M(1− zγ(k)), γ(k) ≤Mzγ(k) ,
y(k) ≤M(1− zζ(k)), ζ(k) ≤Mzζ(k) ,
y(k) − y(k) ≤M(1− zζ(k)), ζ(k) ≤Mzζ(k) ,
zγ
(k)
, zγ
(k)
, zζ
(k)
, zζ
(k) ∈ {0, 1}.
(17)
So far, all constraints in (15) become linear and the only
nonlinear term left in (15) is the bilinear objective function,
which is linearized in the next section.
B. Linearization of Bilinear Objective Function
Since (6) is a linear programming problem, the strong
duality holds, i.e.,
− (c(k))>x(k) + αk1>x(k) − βk1>y(k) + (d(k))>y(k)
= (γ(k))>x(k) − (γ(k))>x(k) − (ζ(k))>y(k). (18)
As such, from (3b), (3c), and (18), the following relation holds:
n∑
k=1
∑
j∈D˜k
(αkp
d
j − βkrdj ) =
n∑
k=1
((c(k))>x(k) − (d(k))>y(k)
+ (γ(k))>x(k) − (γ(k))>x(k) − (ζ(k))>y(k)). (19)
2Note that despite we use the same notation M to represent a big number,
the value of M may be chosen differently in different constraints.
Similarly, the strong duality holds since (1) is a linear pro-
gramming problem, i.e.,
(ag)>pg − (ad)>pd + (bg)>rg + (bd)>rd =
− (µ+ µ)>f + νr + (ρg)>pg − (ρg)>pg
+ (ρd)>pd − (ρd)>pd − (ηg)>rg − (ηd)>rd (20)
which can be also written as:∑
j∈D˜
(−adjpdj + bdjrdj ) =
∑
j∈D−D˜
(adjp
d
j − bdjrdj ) (21)
− (ag)>pg − (bg)>rg − (µ+ µ)>f + νr + (ρg)>pg
− (ρg)>pg + (ρd)>pd − (ρd)>pd − (ηg)>rg − (ηd)>rd.
The following equalities hold from (7), ∀j ∈ D˜k:
piik = a
d
j + ρ
d
j
− ρdj , ν = bdi + ρdj − ηdj + ηdj . (22)
The following equalities hold from (III-A):
ρd
j
(pdj − rdj ) = ρdjpdj , ρdjpdj = ρdjpdj ,
ηd
j
rdj = 0, η
d
jr
d
j = η
d
jr
d
j .
(23)
From (21) – (23), the following equality holds:
n∑
k=1
∑
j∈D˜k
(−piikpdj + νrdj ) =
∑
j∈D˜
(−ρd
j
pd
j
+ ρdjp
d
j + η
d
jr
d
j )
+
∑
j∈D−D˜
(adjp
d
j − bdj rdj )− (ag)>pg − (bg)>rg
− (µ+ µ)>f + νr + (ρg)>pg − (ρg)>pg
+ (ρd)>pd − (ρd)>pd − (ηg)>rg − (ηd)>rd. (24)
which expresses
∑n
k=1
∑
j∈D˜k(−piikpdj + νrdj ) as a linear
combination of decision variables.
Combining (19) and (24), the objective function of (15)
is now completely linearized, and together with constraints
(3a) – (3c), (7) – (9), (16), (11) – (13), (17), the LSE pricing
problem in (15) is transformed into an MILP problem and can
be solved efficiently using existing solvers.
V. NUMERICAL SIMULATION
In this section, we present several numerical examples to
illustrate the application of the proposed methodology using
the IEEE 9-bus system and the IEEE 118-bus system test
cases. All simulation results are obtained using Matlab 2016b
on a Laptop with the CPU as 2.6 GHz Intel Core i7 and the
memory as 16 GB. The solver for solving the MILP problem
is Gurobi v7.5.2 [25].
A. Small System Test Case
We use a modified version of the IEEE 9-bus test case [26]
as an illustrative example. Buses 1−3 represent generators and
buses 4− 9 represent load buses. We increase the line active
power capacity so that no congestion on the transmission lines
7TABLE I
BASE CASE CLEARING RESULTS WITH/W.O. JOINT BIDDING/PRICING
α∗ ($/MW) ad∗ ($/MW)
C1 C2 C3 C1 C2 C3
with 35.094 35.325 36.299 22.408 22.408 22.408
w.o. 23.885 23.885
β∗ ($/MW) bd∗ ($/MW)
C1 C2 C3 C1 C2 C3
with 6.180 5.009 5.706 5.924 5.924 5.924
w.o. 6.307 6.307
LMP pi∗ ($/MW) profit ($) welfare ($)
with 22.408 2595.422 2578.448
w.o. 23.885 0 2863.647
occur. Moreover, the active power losses are assumed to be
negligible, thus the LF vector Λ is 0.
Consider an LSE that manages 3 different pricing areas,
associated with EUC sets C1, C2, C3, corresponding to buses
6, 7, and 8, respectively. The other load buses 4, 5, and 9
correspond to pricing areas C4, C5, and C6 controlled by other
LSEs. Without loss of generality, we assume that each pricing
area submits one offer/bid block to the WEM. We assume each
pricing area consists of 10 EUCs, with each EUC submitting
3 bids, i.e., Ck = 10 and n
(k)
i = 3, k = 1, 2, 3. The
values of c(k) for k = 1, 2, 3 are independent and identical
distributed (i.i.d.) samples drawn uniformly from [34, 36],
[35, 37], and [36, 38], respectively. The values of d(k) are
i.i.d. samples drawn uniformly from [4, 6], [5, 7], and [6, 8],
respectively. The upper bounds of EUCs’ energy demands
and reserve provisions in area k, x¯(k) and y¯(k), are i.i.d.
samples drawn uniformly from [0.85/Ck, 1.15/Ck] · p¯k and
[0.85/Ck, 1.15/Ck] · r¯k, respectively. In addition, the offers of
other LSEs, i.e., adj for j = 4, 5, 6, are estimated to be i.i.d.
samples drawn uniformly from [20, 22], [21, 23], and [22, 24],
respectively, and their bids, i.e., bdj for j = 4, 5, 6, are also
i.i.d. samples drawn uniformly from [4, 6], [5, 7], and [6, 8]
as the pricing areas C1, C2, C3. The marginal offer prices for
energy agj for j = 1, 2, 3 are sampled uniformly from [20, 22],
[21, 23], and [22, 24], respectively, for the three generators;
and the marginal offer prices for reserve bgj for j = 1, 2, 3 are
sampled uniformly from [3, 5], [4, 6], and [5, 7]. Note that the
offers provided by the generators are in general lower than
the bids submitted by the pricing areas, such that most of the
demands can be cleared. We also set the upper bounds for the
energy price αk and reserve price βk, i.e., α and β, to be 100
and 50, respectively. The lower bounds α and β are both zero.
B. Base Case Clearing Results
The market clearing results of our small test case are shown
in Table I. The clearing price is identical at all buses since the
line congestion does not occur in the base case and the active
power losses are ignored. It is seen that the energy and reserve
prices vary across the areas Ck, even though the WEM clearing
price pi is identical at all buses. In fact, the LSE makes profits
by adapting the prices to the EUCs’ preference. Supposedly
if the EUCs’ willingness to buy is higher than the market
clearing price, the LSE simply sets αk to be the lowest value
in c(k), to clear as many demands from the EUCs as possible.
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Fig. 2. WEM social welfare and LSE’s profit versus LSE’s energy price
offset.
This is verified in Table I since the values 35.094, 35.325, and
36.299 exactly mathc the smallest value in c(k).
We also contrast the base case with the case without joint
bidding and pricing, where the LSE is non-profit and thus the
market clearing price pi is posted directly to the EUCs. The
results for this case are obtained by imposing an additional
constraint in the MILP formulation that REM energy price
α must equal to the LMP pi in the WEM, and the REM
reserve price β must equal to the reserve clearing price ν
in the WEM. As shown in Table I, the profit-seeking LSE
manages to manipulate the WEM to lower the clearing price
for a greater difference from the optimal price it determines.
In addition, a degradation of social welfare is expected due to
this profit-seeking behavior of the LSE.
In addition to the non-profit case, other non-optimal pricing
of the LSE may also have impacts on the clearing results. To
verify this, we vary the value of α by adding offsets with
respect to (w.r.t.) the optimal one α∗. As shown in Fig. 2,
the LSE’s profit is indeed maximized at the optimal prices we
proposed and changes almost monotonically before and after
the peak point. Interestingly, the profit does not decrease to
zero as α increases but rests at a constant level. We recognize
that this level corresponds to the energy consumption level
of y(k), the upper bound of the reserve provided by the
EUC. This is because the LSE seeks to prevent the energy
demand from vanishing to zero (otherwise it will make no
profit from energy), by encouraging the EUCs to provide as
much reserve as possible, which serves as the lower bound for
energy consumption (see (5a)). Moreover, the social welfare
decreases with the increase of α since a smaller demand of
EUCs is satisfied.
C. Impacts of Estimated Parameters
We also investigate how estimated parameters in the tri-layer
model impact the clearing results. Towards this end, we first
vary the parameters in the lower layer, e.g., the coefficients of
EUCs’ benefit functions. In particular, we vary c(k) by adding
offsets w.r.t. its values in the base case. As shown in Fig. 3,
the LMP pi is always overlapped with the LSE’s bids adj for
j = 1, 2, 3, which correspond to the marginal cost of the power
generation. This shows that one way for the profit-seeking
LSE to manipulate the WEM is to submit bids that always
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Fig. 3. LSE’s bids adj and energy prices α
∗
j for j = 1, 2, 3, LMP pi versus
estimated EUCs’ benefit coefficients c(k) (with reserve).
equal to the marginal generation cost so that it can get its
demand cleared at as low price as possible. This phenomena
has also been observed in other simulation settings as shown
later. Moreover, from Fig. 3, the increase of c(k) in general
causes the increase of LSE’s optimal energy prices α. This is
because the optimal price is essentially selected from the c(k)
values, i.e., the marginal benefit of some EUC’s energy block.
Interestingly, however, this change is not monotone, which
causes the abrupt switch of the marginal generator accordingly.
We presume this is due to the presence of reserve trading in the
market. In particular, as α increases, the LMP pi is fixed as the
marginal generation cost from Fig. 3. From the LSE’s objective
function, the first term of profit gained from the energy market
will keep increasing and dominate, if the amount of energy
demand pdj is fixed. Thus, a little increase in the cleared
amount pdj can lead to a great increase in profit. Therefore,
the LSE is willing to decrease the energy price a little to
trade for the increase in amount, with the flexibility of making
profit from the reserve market. With no reserve, however, any
increase of α that does not keep up with the increase of
c(k) (or even decrease) will result in a relatively low profit.
To verify this, we simulate the setting without reserve and
present the results in Fig. 4. It is seen that the energy price
α now increases monotonically with the marginal benefit c(k)
as expected, and the cleared energy demand does not change.
This observation illustrates that the joint pricing and bidding
problem becomes more involved when both reserve and energy
are considered in our tri-layer market structure.
Furthermore, for the upper layer, we vary the estimated
energy bid adj of other LSEs to evaluate how the possible
inaccuracy of the estimation would impact the clearing results.
As shown in Fig. 5, although other LSEs’ bids increase, the
LSE’s bids still always align with the LMP pi, ensuring that it
can be cleared at a low LMP. We observe a peak in the LMP
when the offset equals −10 ($/MW). This observation may
be explained by the flexibility of the reserve in the market. In
fact, as other LSEs’ bids increases, the LMP tends to increase
accordingly, which may decrease the LSE’s profit from energy
market. Therefore, the LSE may increase the energy price (as
shown in Fig. 6) to reduce the amount of cleared energy so as
to mitigate the profit loss resulted from it. Meanwhile, for
compensation, the LSE can turn to the reserve market for
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Fig. 4. LSE’s bids adj and energy prices α
∗
j for j = 1, 2, 3, LMP pi versus
estimated EUCs’ benefit coefficients c(k) (without reserve).
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Fig. 5. LSE’s bids adj and energy prices α
∗
j for j = 1, 2, 3, LMP pi versus
estimated offers of other LSEs adj for j = 4, 5, 6 (with reserve).
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Fig. 6. LSE’s bids adj and energy prices α
∗
j for j = 1, 2, 3, LMP pi versus
estimated offers of other LSEs adj for j = 4, 5, 6 (without reserve).
profit. This explanation is corroborated in Fig. 6 when no
reserve is traded, where the LMP increases anyway and the
LSE has no room to accommodate for profit but decreases the
energy price to encourage energy consumption.
D. Impacts of Congestion
To investigate the impact of line congestion on the LSE’s
joint bidding and pricing, we decrease the line active power
capacity in the base case. As is shown in Table II, the bid
ad varies at different pricing areas (buses) Ck as well. Note
that still, the clearing LMP pi∗ is fully controlled by the bids
9TABLE II
CLEARING RESULTS OF CASE WITH LINE CONGESTION AND CASE WITH
EQUAL ENERGY PRICE AT DIFFERENT PRICING AREAS
α∗ ($/MW) profit ($)C1 C2 C3
congested 35.914 36.919 37.858 965.958
equal price 37.834 37.834 37.834 753.542
ad∗ ($/MW) welfare ($)C1 C2 C3
congested 23.885 23.275 22.408 1876.811
equal price 23.885 23.223 22.750 1901.213
LMP pi∗ ($/MW)
C1 C2 C3
congested 23.885 23.275 22.408
equal price 23.885 23.223 22.750
ad. Interestingly, compared to the base case results in Table
I, the LSE’s profit decreases from $2595.422 to $965.958,
together with the decrease of social welfare from $2578.448
to $1876.811. This is because in general fewer demands can be
satisfied with limited transmission line active power capacity.
In practical electricity market, one LSE may not be allowed
to design different energy and reserve prices at its pricing
areas. Consider this regulation constraint, the LSE may not
be able to achieve the optimal profit. This is corroborated in
Table II, where second rows in the table correspond to the
case with α1 = α2 = α3. The resulted profit $753.542 is less
than the optimal $965.958.
E. Large System Test Case
We further test the proposed model using the IEEE 118-bus
test case [26]. We randomly choose 6 out of the total 64 load
buses, buses 2, 11, 16, 35, 47, 83, to represent different pricing
areas, each aggregating 10 EUCs, with each EUC submitting
3 bids as before. The benefit coefficients c and d are i.i.d.
samples drawn uniformly from [34, 38] and [5, 7], respectively.
The marginal generation cost agj and b
g
j are sampled uniformly
from [21, 25] and [4.5, 7.5], respectively. Other LSEs’ bids
adj and offers b
d
j are sampled uniformly from [33, 39] and
[5.5, 8.5], respectively. The upper limits x¯(k) and y¯(k) are
selected as in the small system case. The line active power
limits are selected randomly from the range of [100, 300] MW.
Similar to the clearing results in the base case, the LSE is
able to pursue profits by designing various energy and reserve
prices α∗ and β∗ across pricing areas, instead of posting
the clearing price pi to the EUCs directly, as is shown in
Table III. Note that since line congestions are considered, the
resulted LMP for both with and without LSE’s joint pricing
and bidding vary across different pricing areas. Moreover, in
the large system case, the LSE’s profit-seeking behavior does
not vary the social welfare significantly from the case without
joint biding/pricing. This suggests that the LSE has smaller
market power in this larger system. In fact, it indeed controls
fewer pricing areas (buses) (6 out of 64) than in the small
system case (3 out of 6).
We also present the computation time and MILP gaps for
solving both cases in Table IV. It is seen that the proposed
approach can efficiently solve the joint pricing and bidding
TABLE III
LARGE SYSTEM CLEARING RESULTS WITH/W.O. JOINT BIDDING/PRICING
α∗ ($/MW)
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6
with 34.109 34.073 37.003 35.307 34.050 37.954
w.o. 21.928 31.954 35.400 34.689 21.711 37.880
ad∗ ($/MW)
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6
with 21.928 30.791 22.435 24.646 21.434 40.873
w.o. 21.928 31.954 35.400 34.689 21.711 37.880
β∗ ($/MW)
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6
with 5.527 5.368 5.645 6.655 5.514 5.872
w.o. 6.061
LMP pi∗ ($/MW)
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6
with 21.928 30.791 22.435 24.646 21.434 40.873
w.o. 21.928 31.954 35.400 34.689 21.711 37.880
profit ($) welfare ($)
with 1116.722 18837.373
w.o. 0 19191.994
TABLE IV
COMPUTATION TIME AND MILP GAPS
presolve time (s) computation time (s) MILP gap (%)
9-bus 0.02 2.17 0.45
118-bus 0.41 36.34 0.29
problem with high precision. Moreover, the proposed method-
ology is scalable to the large system test case.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we proposed a formulation for the optimal
joint bidding and pricing problem of a profit-seeking LSE
based on a tri-layer market model. We show the joint bidding
and pricing problem can be formulated as an MILP problem
by leveraging the duality theory. Consequently, despite the
complex structure of the model, the problem can still be solved
efficiently, making it applicable for practical applications. We
corroborated the applicability of the proposed model through
numerical simulations, and revealed that the LSE’s optimal
strategy is influenced by the EUCs’ benefit functions, other
LSEs’ biding/pricing strategies, and network congestions.
Future works will focus on developing a model with
general-form energy benefit functions and reserve cost func-
tion of the EUCs. Besides, estimation methods for unknown
parameters such as the coefficients of energy benefit func-
tion and reserve cost function of the EUCs, as well as the
bids/offers from GENs and other LSEs will also be investi-
gated.
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